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ABSTRACT
While the introduction of futuristic technologies will establish new options and precedents for state
responses to security scenarios, there are important lessons to be drawn from prior crises. Beginning
with a case study of newly sworn-in leaders during their first major foreign policy ‘test,’ this article
envisions changes to such security scenarios with reference to the development of policies on Lethal
Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). Leadership perceptions and the politics of human
versus machine error, or sharing accountability of fault by states, is considered in the context of a
detailed thought experiment. The second section of the article identifies enhanced collaborative rules
for decreasing the probability of unintentional war at the level of military officers. The final section
considers possible avenues to implement restrictions on LAWS in conventional warfare through
various arms control models. Through the article’s focus on existing architectures of global
governance, readers will be presented with an analysis of the challenges that may confront future
political leaders and technical experts in the field of emerging technologies.
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INTRODUCTION
The development of complex and emerging technologies in
settings of conflict presents distinctive challenges to global security. As
this article will discuss, particular concern often relates to their
management, and the principled and legally ‘permissible’ arguments
that encircle them. Although the apprehensions pertaining to drones
have been deliberated widely, it is the trajectory of Lethal Autonomous
Weapons Systems (LAWS) which has now deepened the debate in this
area among those working as military strategists for uninhabited
systems, specialists of international humanitarian law, and ethicists
working in artificial intelligence (AI). While the international
community has not come to an agreement on a classification for
LAWS, the most important disparity between existing weapons
systems and LAWS is that humans would not directly command the
LAWS to execute or kill a specific target. In this regard, the machine
would come to its own decision independently within the parameters of
its algorithm and mission specifications.
The activities LAWS would be permitted to carry out
legitimately is a key policy consideration. In articulating the emerging
scope of these “machines with the power and discretion to take lives
without human involvement,” António Guterres has told the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) that LAWS “must be prohibited by
69
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international law,” 1 and has attempted to provide leadership direction,
most recently during an address to the Web Summit in December 2020
where he reiterated his call for a ban on LAWS. 2 As noted in the
Secretary-General’s Roadmap for Digital Cooperation released in
2020, Guterres’ call was also matched by a recommendation from a
High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation that he convened, co-chaired
by Melinda Gates and Jack Ma. Here, the main emphasis was that, “life
and death decisions should not be delegated to machines,” 3
necessitating that such “priority actions deserve immediate attention,”
so as to spur human rights and human agency. 4 Guterres also
announced his intention to seek a second five-year term from 2022. 5
Should his bid be successful, Guterres will remain as the SecretaryGeneral until the end of 2026, where he will most likely continue to
push for state action on LAWS. Governance considerations for
LAWS, thus, will most likely continue to expand into a range of areas,

1
Press Release, U.N. Security Council, COVID-19 Pandemic Amplifying,
Exploiting World’s Fragilities, Secretary-General Tells Security Council Debate on
Protecting Civilians in Armed Conflict, U.N. Press Release SC/14196 (May 27,
2020), https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14196.doc.htm [http://web.archive
.org/web/20201020051526/https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14196.doc.
htm].
2
U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General’s message to Web Summit
(Dec. 4, 2020), https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2020-12-04/
secretary-generals-message-web-summit [http://web.archive.org/web/2021012222
3917/https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2020-12-04/secretarygenerals-message-web-summit].
3
U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL:
ROADMAP FOR DIGITAL COOPERATION 17 (June 2020), https://www.un.org
/en/content/digital-cooperation-roadmap/assets/pdf/Roadmap_for_Digital_
Cooperation_EN.pdf
[http://web.archive.org/web/20210110171903/https://
www.un.org/en/content/digital-cooperationroadmap/assets/pdf/Roadmap_for_Digital_Cooperation_EN.pdf].
4
U.N. Secretary-General, The Age of Digital Interdependence: Report of the UN
Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation, at 4-5 (2019), https://www.
un.org/en/pdfs/DigitalCooperation-report-for web.pdf [http://web.archive.org/
web/20210110171902/https://www.un.org/en/pdfs/DigitalCooperation-reportfor%20web.pdf].
5 Guterres to seek second five-year term as UN Secretary-General, UN NEWS (Jan. 11,
2021), https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/01/1081832 [http://web.archive.org
/web/20210112120831/https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/01/1081832].
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including efforts to ‘decrease’ unintentional war, the subject of this
article.
While no one can forecast with confidence the actions of
LAWS, specialists from a multiplicity of professions across the public
and private sectors must contemplate policies to decrease
unintentional armed conflict involving LAWS. Such policies would be
especially applicable for political leaders, who are more likely to be
involved as the decisionmakers in response to an act that could be
interpreted as either an accident or a provocation. Politicians may be
responsible in deciding whether a ‘skirmish’ would veer into the
direction of a diplomatic stand-off, or instead continue towards
becoming a military activity. In endeavoring to provide much needed
conjunctive material to these multifaceted discussions, this article will
begin with a review of political responses during the critical junctures
of potential hostilities, providing a case study on crisis response for
new leaders. The article also identifies enhanced collaboration rules for
decreasing the probability of unintentional wars at the officer level.
Finally, it considers possible avenues to implement restrictions on
LAWS in conventional warfare through various arms control models.
I. LEADERSHIP AND SECURITY SCENARIO REACTIONS
When political leaders opt to use force or to de-escalate a
conflict in response to an incident, traditionally, the notion has been
that antagonists could be relied upon to be logical actors whose
pursuits can be defined and understood. However, when considering
how to respond to a crisis where LAWS are present, it may be
conceivable for robots to have coding inaccuracies. Conversely, it
could be difficult to ascertain the chain of command and the
supervision of LAWS from civilian or military authorities (or even
non-state actors). In short, how would politicians respond differently
to an incident where it is more difficult to determine a state’s intent,
due to the inclusion of a machine ‘actor’? The section below engages
with the notion that reactions by leaders in volatile scenarios
(particularly newly sworn-in leaders), can be viewed as ‘heightened’
decisions in which the politician is facing a foreign policy ‘test’ or crisis.
It is instructive, therefore, to consider how previous presidents have
been confronted with ambiguous security incidents within months of
71
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their inauguration, and to consider as a thought experiment whether
new variables could be introduced in the future by the possible
presence of uninhabited, autonomous devices.
An interesting historical example, which will be considered
below, is the April 2001 South China Sea collision which occurred early
in George W. Bush’s first term. The selection of this incident is not
intended to indicate that other presidents have not also had their
resolve tested early during their first term. In March 2009, Chinese
ships and aircraft harassed U.S. vessels in such a manner the Director
of National Intelligence testified to the Senate Armed Services
Committee that such actions constituted the “most serious” encounter
since the April 2001 incident, with President Obama meeting that
month with China’s foreign minister in the White House. 6 While
intercepts in May and July 2017, early into the term of President
Trump, had by then become more routine, 7 it is possible President
Biden may soon face challenges in response to encounters involving
the military. Three significant events occurred in January 2021. A week
before the Biden inauguration, the Trump Administration declassified
and released the 2018 U.S. Strategic Framework for the Pacific,
previously classified as “secret” and “not for foreign nationals.” 8
Initially to be declassified in the 2040s, the Strategic
Framework for the Pacific indicates the U.S. would “devise and
implement a defense strategy capable of . . . defending the first-island-

MICHAEL GREEN ET AL., COUNTERING COERCION IN MARITIME ASIA:
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF GRAY ZONE DETERRENCE 61, 65 (2017), https://
csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/170505_GreenM_
CounteringCoercionAsia_Web.pdf?OnoJXfWb4A5gw_n6G.8azgEd8zRIM4wq
[http://web.archive.org/web/20190915093922/https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.
com/s3fs-public/publication/170505_GreenM_CounteringCoercionAsia_Web.pdf
?OnoJXfWb4A5gw_n6G.8azgEd8zRIM4wq].
7
Idrees Ali, Chinese jets intercept U.S. surveillance plan: U.S. officials, REUTERS
(July 24, 2017, 9:46 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-military/
chinese-jets-intercept-u-s-surveillance-plane-u-s-officials-idUSKBN1A91QE.
8
Laura Tingle, Previously secret details of Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy
revealed, ABC NEWS (Jan. 12, 2021, 3:52 AM), https://www.abc.net.au/news/202101-12/details-of-trump-administrations-indo-pacific-strategy-revealed/13052216.
6
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chain nations, including Taiwan.” 9 Several days after President Biden’s
inauguration, China flew eight nuclear-capable bombers and four
fighter jets into the Taiwanese air defense identification zone, 10 and
passed a new law explicitly allowing its coastguard to fire on foreign
vessels, 11 described by Manila as a “verbal threat of war to any country
that defies the [Chinese] law; which, if unchallenged, is submission to
it.” 12 While this may presage a future foreign policy challenge in the
region, the technology for LAWS does not yet exist. However, as the
sophistication of AI continues to expand at an exponential rate, it is
not far-fetched to suggest a future president may encounter a scenario
with similarities to the one envisioned in our thought experiment
outlined below. Through an initial background of the case study, its recontextualization involving LAWS, and applications for policy
development, the thought experiment intends to draw on past lessons
to guide future leadership and security scenario reactions.

Cabinet Memorandum on the U.S. Strategic Framework for the IndioPacific,
at
2
(Feb.
15,
2018)
(declassified
Jan.
5,
2021),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20449107/us-strategy-documenton-indo-pacific.pdf [http://web.archive.org/web/20210124024845/https://assets.
documentcloud.org/documents/20449107/us-strategy-document-on-indopacific.pdf]
10 China flies nuclear-capable bombers, fighter jets over Taiwanese waters, ABC NEWS
(Jan. 23, 2021, 8:22 PM), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-01-23/china-fliesnuclear-capable-bombers-and-jets-over-taiwan-waters/13086192; see also US says
support for Taiwan ‘rock-solid’ as Chinese fighter jets enter defence zone for second day, SBS NEWS
(Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.sbs.com.au/news/us-says-support-for-taiwan-rocksolid-as-chinese-fighter-jets-enter-defence-zone-for-second-day
[http://web.
archive.org/web/20210124222042/https://www.sbs.com.au/news/us-sayssupport-for-taiwan-rock-solid-as-chinese-fighter-jets-enter-defence-zone-forsecond-day].
11 China authorises coastguard to fire on foreign vessels in disputed waters of East China
and South China Seas, ABC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2021, 5:37 PM), https://www.abc.net.au/
news/2021-01-23/china-authorises-coast-guard-to-fire-on-foreign-ships-ifneeded/13084754.
12 Philippines files protest over China’s new coastguard laws in South China Sea, ABC
NEWS (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-01-28/philippinesprotests-chinas-threat-of-war-coastguard-law/13096898.
9
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A. Case Study
As Beijing’s response to the April 2001 collision bears some
similarities to the crisis of its embassy in Belgrade being struck by U.S.
missiles in May 1999, it is worthwhile providing some context on the
transition from President Clinton to President Bush as written from
the perspective of the Chinese leadership. The leaders of Beijing
believed the 1999 incident was an intentional act, whereas Washington
made efforts to demonstrate the accident was attributed to human
error. 13 Memoirs of the incidents from China’s perspective are
available, for example, from Qian Qichen (the then Vice-Premier of
China). Recalling the “attack” on the embassy, which he believed could
not have been a “mistake,” Qian asserted that “the midair collision
seemed anything but accidental” because the “U.S. spy planes
frequently had been flying close to Chinese territory in the South China
Sea area.” 14
In addition, Tang Jiaxuan (the then Foreign Minister of China)
provides a detailed account, from his anticipation of the Bush
presidency to the thinking of Chinese leaders following the collision.
“From the second half of 2000,” Tang recalls an increase in
“reconnaissance flights along the edge of China’s waters.” 15 Moreover,
Bush’s rhetoric from a presidential debate had described China as a
“strategic competitor” instead of a “strategic partner,” and Tang
considered that, “it was disturbing to think about the possible adverse
impact on China–U.S. relations should the Bush argument become the
China policy of the U.S. government.” 16 On 1 April, less than three
months after Bush’s inauguration, the collision occurred between the
two nations’ military aircraft. The Chinese pilot went missing, and the
U.S. pilots performed an emergency landing on Hainan, where they
were taken into custody by the Chinese authorities. The U.S. pilots
considered themselves to be “like hostages,” although this
characterization is disputed by Tang, who describes the status of the
pilots as “neither tourists nor honored guests but intruders” who had
SUSAN L. SHIRK, CHINA: FRAGILE SUPERPOWER 218 (2007).
QIAN QICHEN, TEN EPISODES IN CHINA’S DIPLOMACY 157 (2005).
15
TANG JIAXUAN, HEAVY STORM AND GENTLE BREEZE: A MEMOIR OF
CHINA’S DIPLOMACY 328 (2011).
16 Id. at 330.
13
14
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“constraints on them . . . to demand that they cooperate in the
[Chinese] investigation.” 17 Within days, three U.S. Navy destroyers
were dispatched to the vicinity and the presidents of both countries
made public statements. Meanwhile, a Chinese search-and-rescue
operation involving one hundred thousand people was underway in
the area. 18
Susan Shirk, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
responsible for China in the Clinton Administration, coordinated
Washington’s interagency investigation into how the Chinese embassy
in Belgrade had been targeted, and determined that there was “a
combination of errors” linked to a failure to follow processes. 19
However, Shirk notes the perception in China maintained that the U.S.
had superior technology and management techniques, and therefore,
according to this perception, human error could not account for the
“mistake.” 20 In a comparison of the two incidents, Shirk also notes, the
Chinese media’s reporting on the airplane collision had “less enflamed
rhetoric than they had used during the Belgrade embassy crisis.” 21
While the Chinese government had asked for students to stay on
campus during the airplane crisis (where young people vented antiAmerican sentiment on the internet), Beijing’s previous response
during the Belgrade embassy crisis had been to organize buses from
campuses to outside the U.S. embassy, where the students had thrown
Molotov cocktails and bricks. 22 In addition, according to a May 2013
report commissioned by the Pentagon’s most senior strategist, the
Chinese response during the crisis in April 2001 was sophisticated and
exploited the U.S. media. 23 In an analysis of coverage between Xinhua
Id. at 350.
Id. at 340–41.
19
SHIRK, supra note 13, at 218.
20 Id.
21
SHIRK, supra note 13, at 238.
22 Id. at 213–14, 237–39.
23
Peter Mattis, Chinese Propaganda and Positioning in the Sino-American Crises:
The EP-3 and the Impeccable Case, in CHINA: THE THREE WARFARES 226–245 (Stefan
Halper ed., 2013), http://images.smh.com.au/file/2014/04/11/5343124/China_
%20The%20three%20warfares.pdf [http://web.archive.org/web/2020110900345
0/http://images.smh.com.au/file/2014/04/11/5343124/China_%2520The%2520
three%2520warfares.pdf]; see also John Garnaut, US unsettled by China’s ‘three warfares’
strategy: Pentagon report, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Apr. 11, 2014), https://
17
18
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and the New York Times, international opinion was shaped through a
campaign of influence which “juxtaposed Xinhua’s version of events
with U.S. statements without subjecting either side to analytic scrutiny,
giving Beijing’s propaganda pronouncements equal standing,” and
thus it created a “false equivalency,” 24 which shifted perceptions
among some of the U.S. populace further toward the Chinese view.
In a bilateral dispute of this nature, the number of positions is
limited to just two: a position supported by either one party, or by both
parties. Initially, the U.S. and China had maintained separate positions,
accusing the other of fault. The U.S. later acquiesced to some elements
maintained by the Chinese position, to such an extent that it created,
“from a diplomatic or conflict resolution standpoint, constructive
ambiguity.” 25
B. Contextualizing the case study
The case study of the incident in April 2001, outlined above,
provides a limited frame of reference and serves as an example for
illustrative purposes only. As a thought experiment, contemplate if
there was a collision between a human pilot and an uninhabited device
(instead of colliding with another human or group of humans). A
method to conduct this analysis would need to consider the potential
variables – the states’ positions, the scenario in dispute, and the
difficulty in reaching an outcome. Table 1 (below) considers a
simplified hypothetical scenario if the U.S. EP-3 manned plane were
replaced with an autonomous aircraft. A more comprehensive
framework could, however, rely upon such an examination across
multiple scenarios, developed by specialists to further consider the
range of policy options available in advising leaders’ decision-making
and crisis responses.

www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/us-unsettled-by-chinas-three-warfares-strategypentagon-report-20140410-36g45.html
24
Mattis, supra note 23, at 235, 240.
25
Kevin Avruch & Zheng Wang, Culture, Apology, and International Negotiation:
The Case of the Sino-U.S. ‘Spy Plane’ Crisis, 10 INT’L NEGOT. 337, 345 (2005),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1571806054740958.
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Table 1
Contentions and possible arguments for collision with an
autonomous system
Contention

Argument in favor

Argument against

Human at fault

Previous history of
unsafe maneuvers
from the pilot.

Pilot has skills and
experience (e.g., flight
hours) to not make a
fatal mistake.

Machine at fault

Software issues
Algorithm indicates
difficult to rule out
the system adheres to
due to algorithm
codes of conduct and
‘length,’ or computer international law, and
operation affected by collectively it may have
hardware malfunction more ‘hours’ than any
or other issues.
single human.

Shared fault

Military exchanges
did not develop
adequate policies to
prevent incident.
Machine may use
components in a
supply chain from
both countries.

One military did not
follow advice received
during exchange from
the other. A state’s
quality assurance
processes were not
adequate.

Accident or causes
unable to
determined

May be difficult to
reach an objective
finding if ‘black box’
(or equivalent type
device) is unable to be
recovered.

Political matter with
history and
considerations that go
beyond the technical
aspects of the most
recent incident.
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Each row of the above table will be briefly discussed below.
The first contention is where the human is at fault. Accounting
for the uncertainties associated with new technology, it is likely that
the government responsible for the manned plane would indicate the
number of flight hours its pilot had undertaken in order to ‘prove’ the
collision was not due to human error. The Chinese pilot, Wang Wei,
had recorded 1,152 flying hours, “without incidents of negligence,
oversights, or anything to indicate the possibility of an accident,”
according to Tang’s account of the actual crisis. 26 Yet, this would not
rule out pilot error. In December 2000, the U.S. had complained about
the PLA flying in close proximity. Moreover, weeks before the
collision, Wang Wei harassed the U.S. crew by flying close enough to
display something through the surface of his aircraft canopy; the U.S.
later released a photo of Wang holding a piece of paper against his
window, upon which he had written his email address as a taunt, which
allowed the U.S. to describe Wang’s reputation as someone “known to
the American EP-3 crews as a Top Gun-style hotdogger.” 27 Clearly, the
presence of an autonomous aircraft would not necessarily eliminate the
possibility that a human could still have caused the incident.
The second row of the table considers the possibility where the
machine is at fault. In analyzing this hypothetical scenario, the
proponents defending the autonomous aircraft could suggest the
algorithm and hardware were demonstrably reliable. According to such
a proposition, if the sensors were not faulty, and without mistakes in
the programming, the LAWS could have conceivably followed
international regulation and bilateral codes of conduct, ruling out
machine error as the cause of the crash. If the other party submitted a
request to verify the evidence in support of this claim, it may also be
possible to do so, provided both states held the view that the matter
could be resolved through an investigation on the technical aspects and
without ‘politicizing’ the broader context, e.g., avoiding deliberation on
previous encounters which would be considered outside the scope.

26
27

TANG, supra note 15, at 340.
SHIRK, supra note 13, at 237; see also Mattis, supra note 23, at 235.
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Relying upon technical considerations as the sole criteria,
however, is a risky proposition based on the precedent it creates. In
the case of the May 1999 bombing of the embassy in Belgrade, China’s
perception that U.S. technology was ‘superior’ did not allow its leaders
to acknowledge U.S. officers had made mistakes in targeting the wrong
building. Moreover, according to the argument by Chinese officials,
the belief that machine error was not the cause, had the effect of
exacerbating the crisis by suggesting that the incident ‘must’ therefore
have been due to ‘intentional’ decisions by people. In the hypothetical
experiment of an autonomous aircraft crashing with a human pilot,
even if a machine had not been at fault in that specific case, elevating
the status of technology above the level of humans creates a risk that
future incidents are unable to be explained as machine error.
Another justification for the machine not being at fault could
be the policy of a state for their autonomous devices to protect military
property. In this scenario, the device would effectively be relying upon
an argument for self-defense. This aspect would be particularly
important if, instead of a collision occurring, the machine, anticipating
the possibility of its own destruction, had fired upon the manned
aircraft and in the process, injured the pilot. On the other hand, the
loss of an uninhabited device could be an alternative policy outcome
by providing a moral justification to prevent the use-of-force against a
human in peacetime.
The contention in the third row of the table relates to fault
being shared between the parties. Such a scenario would require the
national interests of both sides to value the bilateral relationship. In
addition, leaders would need to support the further deepening of
military-to-military exchanges, including by a joint development of
policies intended to mitigate the reoccurrence of such an incident.
Even if fault could be attributed to both parties, it is unlikely to be an
entirely equal ‘share’ of the blame. For example, it is possible one side
could have called upon the other to make certain adjustments during
previous ‘close calls,’ or that a greater portion of the hardware or
software may originate from only one of the countries.
The adoption of joint responsibility as an outcome would,
nevertheless, most likely signify greater influence by foreign ministries
79
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in seeking to reset the agenda in the interests of stabilizing the bilateral
relationship, compared to the specialized role of the military where the
protection of the life of enlisted personnel may be of a greater concern.
In the hypothetical scenario, there would be less motivation for such
intensive contact between militaries, and less incentive for a state to
admit fault with the operation of the autonomous device and
apologize. In April 2001, the U.S. led by its ambassador (who was
himself a former navy pilot) sought extensive consultation with the
Chinese foreign ministry to secure the release of the EP-3 crew. In the
absence of prisoners, the injured nation may evaluate different
retaliatory measures, in juxtaposition to a human being taken into
custody.
Finally, as noted in the fourth row of the table, the contention
here would be that the collision was an accident or that the causes were
unable to determined. In this scenario, it is probable that the matter
would encompass political judgements that are beyond the scope of
the stand-alone incident. Originating either due to a lack of evidence
regarding the causes of the incident – or where a finding indicated that
the incident occurred despite the proper adherence to process by all
parties – in this scenario it may be possible to allow for a political
consensus to be reached with greater ease. While the prospect that a
future incident may be unable to be avoided due to an absence of
‘lessons learned,’ and could thereby appear to be unsatisfying, this
outcome would not necessarily preclude the benefits of remediation
efforts that could arise in response to the ‘shared fault’ scenario.
Conversely, it may even be convenient (for some actors) to not find
evidence during their investigation, which could suggest a ‘human at
fault’ or ‘machine at fault’ contention and, thus, a rearrangement of the
political circumstances to something less neutral.
C. Drawing applications from the case study
Evidently, the presence of autonomous devices in the future
would make such decision-making even more difficult than it is today.
Given the intense uncertainty that decisionmakers will potentially
confront when evaluating and ultimately reacting to such scenarios –
perhaps in time-critical situations – it is essential they recognize all
possibilities of human or machine error and the broader milieu before
80
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rushing to any conclusion. As the precipitous speed and intensification
of technology progresses in the digital age, political leaders will
encounter circumstances requiring determinations involving
uncertainty inherent to incidents where LAWS are likely to be
involved.
If a dispute involving LAWS escalates, leaders should continue
to communicate with their counterparts, when feasible, to prevent
miscalculation if there is continued ambiguity. The establishment or
use of a ‘hotline’ could provide logistical capabilities. However, its
presence may indicate only a pre-determined intention to
communicate, rather than facilitate a pathway toward a successful
resolution. Some leaders may even be unwilling to pick up the phone
as a negotiation tactic. While states undoubtedly could reciprocate
against hostile force, human assessment is necessary before scaling up
the antagonism as LAWS could not make these judgments objectively.
Ultimately, while the Charter of the United Nations does not place
restrictions on states’ intrinsic rights to individual or collective selfdefense against an armed attack until the UNSC takes measures to
restore international peace and security, state responses should
nevertheless demonstrate military necessity, proportionality, and
clearly distinguish the enemy combatants from non-military targets in
accordance with the principles of Just War. 28 Furthermore, the
Guiding Principles developed by the Group of Governmental Experts
(GGE) have “affirmed that international law, in particular the UN
Charter and international humanitarian law,” will guide the work
towards an outcome on LAWS through the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons (CCW). The status of the principles, however,
is not currently legally binding, and thereby it remains unclear as to
whether the international community has an appetite to introduce
stricter rules in this area. 29

28
Peter M. Asaro, How Just Could a Robot War Be?, in CURRENT ISSUES IN
COMPUTING AND PHILOSOPHY 55 (Adam Briggle et al. eds., 2008).
29 Report of the 2019 session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging
Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, at 13, U.N. Doc.
CCW/GGE.1/2019/3 (Sept. 25, 2019), https://undocs.org/en/CCW/GGE.1/
2019/3 [http://web.archive.org/web/20200919072200/https://undocs.org/en/
CCW/GGE.1/2019/3].
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As the article will illuminate further, the proliferation of
autonomy in AI is already establishing uncertain benchmarks for a
largely untested military technology, with some of these consequences
becoming foreseeable in the form of leadership reactions to ambiguous
security scenarios. Having considered the broader context and
variables at the top of the chain-of-command in the section above, the
next section focuses on the officer level. It presents a set of measures
aimed at decreasing the scope of unintentional war through enhanced
collaborative rules, before an incident escalates into a crisis requiring
decision-making to move from the military to political levels.
II. DECREASING THE PROBABILITY OF UNINTENTIONAL WAR VIA
ENHANCED COLLABORATIVE RULES

Militaries can redefine the security environment they inhabit
by discovering areas for collaborative development with each other.
The precepts of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the Rules
of Engagement (ROE) are generally well understood as they apply to
various professions. Among other potential areas for collaboration,
regulations such as IHL and ROE will need to be clarified from a
legislative standpoint and converted into ‘zeroes and ones,’ which
would allow a robot to implement the programs in the intended
manner of its instructions. It is more likely such a process would face
challenges similar to those which already exist today. Digital tools to
calculate and reduce collateral damage have been used by the U.S.
Department of Defense since at least 2003. 30 Yet, while software to
assist officers with estimating the collateral damage is based on
particular variables, it currently does not provide an answer to all of
the requirements to make a decision, such as military necessity. 31 Of

30
Michael Press, Of Robots and Rules: Autonomous Weapon Systems in the Law of
Armed Conflict, 48 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1337, 1359 (2017), https://www.law.
georgetown.edu/international-law-journal/wp-content/uploads/sites/21/2018/05
/48-4-Of-Robots-and-Rules.pdf
[http://web.archive.org/web/20210126045354
/https://www.law.georgetown.edu/international-law-journal/wp-content
/uploads/sites/21/2018/05/48-4-Of-Robots-and-Rules.pdf].
31
Kenneth Anderson et al., Adapting the Law of Armed Conflict to Autonomous
Weapon Systems, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 386, 403 (2013), https://digital-commons.
usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1015&context=ils [http://web.archive.org
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course, even if IHL and ROE could be agreed upon by legal scholars
in collaboration with software developers, in general, algorithms tend
to have some flaws which become evident during their use. The
probability of a mistake being coded into such a program to execute a
legal decision by LAWS, will require the highest level of scrutiny.
We therefore recommend applying collaborative principles in
this area to foster greater exchanges between states’ militaries,
including those engaged at the officer level. Developing a shared
understanding could promote a higher level of assurance than perhaps
could be indicated inhouse or by a contracted audit partner alone. That
said, there are seemingly contradictory priorities between being
‘completely’ transparent and maintaining information that would fasttrack an adversary’s development for their own technologies. Each
state will need to make its own judgment relating to their appropriate
management of risks. The forfeiture of confidential information
relating to the legal assessments of IHL and ROE compliance by a
machine, may otherwise decrease the probability of inadvertent
outcomes occurring from disputes involving LAWS. These would
include the possibility of a confrontation between two sets of opposing
LAWS where each nation state has deployed a model with proprietary
legal interpretations.
Specific models may be tailored to a particular state’s national
interest within the architecture of global governance. While informal
dialogue certainly could assist in the early stages of development, a
treaty may promote a broader level of consensus. Alternatively, states
may proclaim to observe key components as a matter of policy, while
some activities remain separated from the agreement in specific and
limited circumstances. The CCW has a total of 125 state parties and
four signatories; however, this number is also spread across different
protocols. For example, only 86 states have signed up to Amended
Article I, which extends the application of the CCW and its protocols
to non-international armed conflicts, whereas an additional 32 states
have also agreed to Protocol I, prohibiting non-detectable fragments. 32
/web/20210126023920/https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1015&context=ils].
32
United Nations, High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons, https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/3CE
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Therefore, even within a model shaped through the architecture of the
United Nations, state parties can join over time and, thus, increase the
universality of an arms control regime progressively. As the next
section will also indicate with reference to the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR), an agreement outside of the United Nations
can still influence global norms when its design and legacy are given
legitimacy or recognition by peak UN bodies. Evidently, the pursuit of
a common goal can be achieved through collaborative efforts on an
essentially non-binding basis, without prejudice to the national interest
or commitments to an agreement that ‘locks in’ a future administration
to potentially irreversible national security risks.
Militaries may also choose to reach an in-principle
understanding with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to
further their implementation of IHL and ROE. An advantage is how
such an approach could conceivably provide for the external detection
of inaccuracies that were ‘missed’ during a preliminary self-assessment,
or to provide additional assurance to humanitarian workers on the
compliance of LAWS as new (but verifiable) weapons. Noting the
current discussions on the framing of LAWS in legal versus ethical
terminologies, 33 such talks could also consider the compliance aspects
of machine autonomy from a non-theoretical perspective. For
example, while an algorithm should be able to visualize and
acknowledge the unique status of non-combatants, NGO workers
voluntarily could provide military officials with information on their
activities to update the databases used to qualify the legality of a strike.
As noted by Lieutenant Colonels John Cherry and Christopher
Korpela, BONUS sub-munitions are advanced enough to compare an
image of a target to their databases and self-destruct in the middle of
their trajectory if a medical vehicle is identified instead of a combatant

7CFC0AA4A7548C12571C00039CB0C?OpenDocument [http://web.archive.org/
web/20201130052613/https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/
3CE7CFC0AA4A7548C12571C00039CB0C?OpenDocument] (last updated June
17, 2020).
33
Elvira Rosert & Frank Sauer, How (Not) to Stop the Killer Robots: A
Comparative Analysis of Humanitarian Disarmament Campaign Strategies, 42 CONTEMP.
SEC. POL’Y 4, 22 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2020.1771508.
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vehicle. 34 As stated, “munitions such as a BONUS round properly
employed by a commander and other similar technologies are the
current and future of LAWS, not killer robots detached from
command and control.” 35
In this manner, NGOs which otherwise may have reluctance
to provide their assistance in areas of conflict, would have an
opportunity to collaboratively develop protections for use by
humanitarian workers who may not believe LAWS inherently possess
the proper situational awareness and capability for distinction,
compared with humans. While such actions alone are a small
component of the requirements for ‘meaningful human control,’ they
could also assist with weapons review processes before and throughout
deployment. Yet, the premeditated distortion of this system “would
arguably amount to perfidy,” 36 which could be considered under IHL
to “betray the confidence of the adversary” through “simulation of
protected status,” and depending on the circumstances, may be
considered as a war crime. 37
Nevertheless, effectively validating compliance with IHL and
ROE does not necessarily overcome the dangers arising from LAWS
failing to have enough circumstantial awareness. Some actions are
symbolic but can be crucial for sending a warning. As indicated in the
previous section, the actions by Wang Wei in his previous flights could
have multiple interpretations. While the U.S. interpretation had been
34
John Cherry & Christopher Korpela, Enhanced Distinction: The Need for a
More Focused Autonomous Weapons Targeting Discussion at the LAWS GGE, INT’L COMM.
RED CROSS HUM’N L. & POL’Y (Mar. 28, 2019), https://blogs.icrc.org/law-andpolicy/2019/03/28/enhanced-distinction-need-focused-autonomous-weaponstargeting/ [http://web.archive.org/web/20210126053636/https://blogs.icrc.org/
law-and-policy/2019/03/28/enhanced-distinction-need-focused-autonomousweapons-targeting/].
35 Id.
36
Maziar Homayounnejad, Ensuring Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems Comply
with International Humanitarian Law, TRANSNAT’L L. I. THINK 22 (2017),
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3073893.
37 Rule 65. Perfidy, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.
icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule65 [http://web.archive.org/web/202
10125085734/https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1
_rul_rule65] (last visited Mar. 3, 2021).
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that Wang was ‘taunting’ its crew, in the view of the Chinese, he may
have been warning them. Going back even further into history,
simulated attacks from the USSR had “enable[d] U.S. commanders to
recognize these attacks during crises” and thus provided “an ‘action
language’ for signaling their U.S. adversaries and American political
leaders.” 38
Although the above proposals on decreasing the probability of
unintentional war via enhanced collaborative tools primarily relate to
LAWS not possessing the requisite recognition in the context of
signaling, it is worth noting that leaders may not yet have come to a
common understanding on how the deployment of LAWS could,
itself, be used as a signal. Further underscoring the continued use of
messaging in heightened security crises, one of the policies of the U.S.
today is to “deter regional aggression and assure distant allies” through
the flights of bomber aircraft which provide “effective signaling for
deterrence and assurance.” 39 In the forthcoming years, one leader may
need to determine how the presence of LAWS could impact another’s
perceptions. Would the deployment of LAWS be a similar threshold?
Thirty states have so far have called for a ban on fully autonomous
weapons, 40 and they may hold different perceptions than nations
considering the potential benefits that may arise from developing such
autonomous systems.
Furthermore, people may also need to consider how robots
‘themselves’ may signal an adversary. As both states would have an
interest in preventing an inadvertent conflict that leads to unplanned
escalation, political and military strategists should consider what
Sean M. Lynn-Jones, A Quiet Success for Arms Control: Preventing Incidents at
Sea, 9 INT’L SEC. 154, 159 (1985), http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2538545.
39
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW 47 (2018), https://
media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEARPOSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF [http://web.archive.org/web/2019
0920051805/https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF].
40
MARY WAREHAM, STOPPING KILLER ROBOTS: COUNTRY POSITIONS ON
BANNING FULLY AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS AND RETAINING HUMAN CONTROL 4
(2020),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2020/08/arms0820
_web_0.pdf [http://web.archive.org/web/20210130055002/https://www.hrw.org
/sites/default/files/media_2020/08/arms0820_web_0.pdf].
38
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customs are likely to eventuate from the introduction of this emerging
technology. By means of ensuring a ‘failsafe’ is available in the event
of ambiguous signaling, it may be worthwhile to have communications
infrastructure between the humans who administer or oversee the
LAWS. The essential factor is humans preserving the ability to
communicate with their opponent. Assuming the political and military
leadership supported such a proposal, the method would need to be
reached technically. One option may include having centralized
databases for communications across certain geographical regions, as
agreed by a treaty between two or more countries. Another pathway
may allow for one LAWS in proximity to another to pass on messages
sent between the respective human counterparts. In yet another
scenario, following misinterpretation between a human and the LAWS
that could result in the LAWS not understanding a signal of intent, the
human could seek to send a standardized ‘message-alert’ through the
LAWS to its human commander, who may possess the disposition to
avert escalation or mitigate the scale of retaliation. Implementation of
the above measures should, thereby, decrease the likelihood of
unintentional actions from LAWS or avert unnecessary escalation.
The creation of the requisite infrastructure for such
transmissions would be complicated in certain types of conditions,
such as underwater. As Krepinevich notes, “It seems plausible that,
given the cost disparity” between autonomous weapons compared to
submarines, “maritime competitors could arm and deploy them as
undersea ‘kamikaze’ devices or delivery systems” for anti-submarine
warfare. 41 However, the underwater links needed for the observation
of such devices would be difficult to construct, not to mention who
wears the cost. Unlike land or aerial systems, maritime operations will
have greater difficulties with relaying data signals. 42 Nevertheless,
innovations in the area of underwater communications indicate some
possibilities for considering the development of “hydrospatial

ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH, MARITIME COMPETITION IN A MATURE
PRECISION-STRIKE REGIME 82 (2014), https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents
/MMPSR-Web.pdf.
42
ANTHONY FINN & STEVE SCHEDING, DEVELOPMENTS AND
CHALLENGES FOR AUTONOMOUS UNMANNED VEHICLES: A COMPENDIUM (2010),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10704-7.
41
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infrastructure” 43 with shared applications. Enabling such an
autonomous device to remain surreptitious inside of a delineated area
may be possible while maintaining infrastructure for an enhanced set
of collaborative rules. While not a military example, the voyage of
filmmaker and explorer James Cameron to the Mariana Trench, the
deepest point in the ocean, demonstrated how a civilian was able to
remain in constant contact with the surface via an underwater
telephone, respond to a voice message from his partner, and send a
tweet from that location. 44 Communication with underwater LAWS
would be significantly less cost-effective if each nation pursued
separate programs that were, nevertheless, intended to permit
communication with each other’s officers. Most concerning would be
a scenario that involves states having no control over their underwater
deployed autonomous systems, ruling out the suggestions we have
articulated in the above pertaining to decreasing the probability of
unintentional war.
In summary, a common understanding of how robots would
be programmed by nation states to interpret and respond to their
environment will increase the capacity to approximate more precisely,
the extent to which LAWS would react proportionately to hostilities.
And further, the capacity to undertake the requisite actions in
fulfilment of political and military objectives. Such efforts would spur
reciprocal understanding and lessen some of the capriciousness of
robot-to-robot encounters. The implementation of common
guidelines and legal understandings through its most open approach
would involve collaboration across the public, private, and nongovernmental sectors, and may even use the principles of an openMathias Jonas, How to Use the Term Hydrospatial?, HYDRO INT’L (Jan. 26,
2021),
https://www.hydro-international.com/content/article/how-to-use-theterm-hydrospatial [http://web.archive.org/web/20210127101012/https://www.
hydro-international.com/content/article/how-to-use-the-term-hydrospatial]
(explaining that the term “Hydrospatial infrastructure” could be inspired by the
“geospatial infrastructure”).
44
Paul Roberts et al., Communications to the Deepest Point on Earth: Underwater
Communication Solution for James Cameron’s Deepsea Challenge, HYDRO INT’L (Mar. 26,
2013), https://www.hydro-international.com/content/article/communications-tothe-deepest-point-on-earth [http://web.archive.org/web/20201021190726/https:
//www.hydro-international.com/content/article/communications-to-the-deepestpoint-on-earth].
43
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source approach, such as observed with the creation and maintenance
of internet standards. 45 A more targeted option, however, would
involve military exchanges and dialogue with relevant NGOs. Overall,
these essentially non-binding initiatives could lessen the scope of
miscalculation, or otherwise provide a means to simplify the different
probabilities of how LAWS could, respectively, administer IHL in their
own way.
III. IMPLEMENTING RESTRICTIONS ON LAWS IN CONVENTIONAL
WARFARE

One benefit of LAWS would be their capacity for traversing regions
or conditions beyond human tolerance. If the power source were
adequate to fuel the operating system and hardware, and humanassisted maintenance were not required during a particular mission,
LAWS could withstand heat and freezing temperatures in desert
environments for an extended period, the pressures of deep-sea ocean
diving, navigate across high altitudes, or protect satellites through use
as a robotic spaceplane across various orbits. For some operations,
LAWS may only need to contain munitions specific to the mission
parameters; for instance, in an urban environment where close combat
is expected, small arms would be more appropriate than artillery. 46 The
dilution of weapons that a machine far more powerful than a person
may carry, could assist states to comply with IHL-related elements
pertaining to the proportionate use-of-force. Consequently,
classifications of LAWS would have a distinctive set of risk
management guidelines once consensus is reached on separate
categories and a method is devised to safeguard arms sales from
surpassing such thresholds. As indicated above, separate articles or
protocols could exist under the framework of an overarching arms
control agreement to allow for governance and regulations on different
types of autonomous weapons. These variations may promote action
at first where it is easier to reach an agreement – for example, sparsely
populated areas where the risk to civilians is much lower – before more
Thomas Richard Davies, Governing Communications, in GOVERNING THE
WORLD? CASES IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 114–27 (Sophie Harman & David
Williams eds., 2013).
46
Press, supra note 30, at 1360.
45
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complex tasks can be considered and the principle of distinction is
more difficult for LAWS to observe.
Upon joining the CCW, states parties agree to “the principle
of international law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to
choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited,” and thus
prohibit or restrict “the use of weapons which may be deemed to be
excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects.” 47 For example,
the protocols of the CCW restrict usage of incendiary weapons,
landmines, non-detectable fragments, and blinding lasers. 48 The CCW
promotes disarmament by banning or limiting the use of weapons
which may be indiscriminate or cause disproportionate damage or
casualties, and it can be revised with additional protocols to “respond
to new developments in weapons technology and challenges in armed
conflicts.” 49 From 2014 to 2016, through meetings held under the
CCW, the United Nations assembled yearly informal Meetings of
Experts on LAWS. 50 Its original decree was “to discuss the questions
related to emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous
weapons systems, in the context of the objectives and purposes of the
Convention,” and dialogue encompassing technical issues, ethics and
sociology, international law, and military aspects. 51
Since 2017, discussions have continued through the GGE on
emerging technologies in the area of LAWS. 52 The CCW seemed the
most plausible setting for a protocol on LAWS, although the
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, a coalition of NGOs, has called on
47
UNITED NATIONS, CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL
WEAPONS 4 (2014), https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content
/uploads/assets/publications/more/ccw/ccw-booklet.pdf [http://web.archive.org
/web/20190920084430/https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wpcontent/uploads/assets/publications/more/ccw/ccw-booklet.pdf].
48 Id. at 6.
49 Id at 11.
50
Rosert & Sauer, supra note 33, at 20.
51
Chairperson of the Meeting of Experts, Report of the 2014 Informal
Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), ¶ 1, U.N.
Doc. CCW/MSP/2014/3 (Nov. 13, 2014), https://undocs.org/ccw/msp/2014/3
[http://web.archive.org/web/20201213013451/https://undocs.org/ccw/msp/
2014/3].
52
Rosert & Sauer, supra note 33, at 20.
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states to launch formal negotiations no later than the CCW’s Review
Conference in December 2021, warning that “failure to do so would
fatally undermine public trust and confidence in the CCW framework’s
ability to solve this challenge.” 53 Although decision-making through
the CCW theoretically needs to achieve only a simple majority vote
(rather than consensus) to create a legally binding instrument, Rosert
and Sauer’s analysis of the Campaign’s strategy finds it has missed “the
most straightforward argument,” which they suggest should be “not a
legal but an ethical one . . . less susceptible to consequentialist counterpositions (which argue that the illegality of LAWS will be remedied by
technological progress).” 54 Based on the possibility of failure to reach
an agreement by the end of 2021, two other options – outside of the
framework of the CCW – are considered below.
The MTCR has “set an effective international standard” and
“international benchmark” for national export control. Its guidelines
and technical annex allow for “adherence to a common export policy”
and can assist with the obligation on all states to implement UNSC
Resolution 1540, 55 including the adoption of the MTCR standards by
the United Nations. 56 The MTCR is “unique in its focus on the means
of delivery” of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) “rather than the
WMD themselves,” promoting best practices among its membership
and, significantly, through outreach activities to non-members. 57 Since
53 Convention on Conventional Weapons Policy Brief: Nov. 2020, CAMPAIGN TO
STOP KILLER ROBOTS 2, https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/uploads/
2020/05/CCW-Policy-Brief-November-2020.pdf [http://web.archive.org/web/2
0201101021258/https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/uploads/2020
/05/CCW-Policy-Brief-November-2020.pdf] (last updated Nov. 2020).
54
Rosert & Sauer, supra note 33, at 22–23.
55
MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME, WHO ARE WE AND WHAT DO
WE DO? (2020), https://mtcr.info/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/
MTCR-Pamphlet.pdf
[http://web.archive.org/web/20201026231034/https://
mtcr.info/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/MTCR-Pamphlet.pdf].
56
Jeffrey Taylor, Public Statement from the Plenary Meeting of the Missile Technology
Control Regime, Auckland, Oct. 11, 2019, MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME
(Oct. 18, 2019), https://mtcr.info/public-statement-from-the-plenary-meeting-ofthe-missile-technology-control-regime-auckland-11-october-2019/
[http://web.archive.org/web/20201126231639/https://mtcr.info/publicstatement-from-the-plenary-meeting-of-the-missile-technology-control-regimeauckland-11-october-2019/].
57
Taylor, supra note 56.
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its establishment more than thirty years ago, participation has increased
to 35 countries, 58 including France, Germany, India, Russia, Turkey,
South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. 59 For a comparison
using the same number, the MTCR membership accounts for a large
portion of the top 35 arms exporting countries in the world (71%), and
most of its value (92%). 60 Outreach activities are also conducted with
non-members, including China and Israel (which rank as the fourth
and ninth largest arms suppliers globally). 61
Keeping stride with technical innovations and advancements
via frequent updates, the MTCR harmonizes rules without disrupting
legitimate trade, and the incoming Chair has indicated the privatization
of space programs is an emerging area with “substantial technological
overlap between the technology used to transport satellites into space
and that used to deliver WMD.” 62 The MTCR presently defines a
threshold on specific weapons, including rockets, unmanned aerial
vehicle systems, and associated technologies adept to transporting
WMDs or any payload of at least 500 kg (1102 lbs.) up to a distance of
at least 300 km (186 miles). 63 LAWS, as uninhabited devices, could
arguably be perceived to meet these criterion, implying their
proliferation already may be constrained under the MTCR. The model,
consequently, demonstrates its capacity to tackle the challenges
MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME N.Z., MISSILE TECHNOLOGY
CONTROL REGIME NEWSLETTER 2, 4–5, (Sept. 3, 2020), https://
mtcr.info/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/MTCR-newsletter-final-.pdf
[http://web.archive.org/web/20200927020050/https://mtcr.info/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2020/09/MTCR-newsletter-final-.pdf].
59
Taylor, supra note 56.
60 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RES. INST.,
https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers
[http://web.archive.org/web/
20210131000300/https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers] (last visited Jan.
31, 2021) (evaluating a comparison of the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute’s arms transfers database trend-indicator value of arms exports from the
top 35 largest exporters of 2019).
61 Id.
62
MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME NEWSLETTER, supra note 59.
63 Equipment, Software and Technology Annex, MISSILE TECHNOLOGY
CONTROL REGIME 16 (2019), https://mtcr.info/wordpress/wp-content/uploads
/2019/10/MTCR-TEM-Technical_Annex_2019-10-11-1.pdf
[http://web.archive.org/web/20201203224358/http://mtcr.info/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/MTCR-TEM-Technical_Annex_2019-10-11-1.pdf].
58
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emanating from the acquisition risks of LAWS with larger payloads.
Conceivably, this form of informal model of partnership by states, with
national responsibility (and control) over the implementation of policy,
may be suitable for the regular updates of technical facets, creating best
practice, and encouraging state participation on a voluntary basis.
Despite the lack of official verification requirements compared
to some other arms control treaties, each state may pass laws or adopt
a policy to address breaches, and in essence, give ‘teeth’ to the accord.
For example, the President of the United States may impose sanctions
to deny contracts or licenses to foreign persons engaging in the trade
or facilitation of MTCR equipment or technology, or conspiring to do
so. 64 As an interesting historical parallel, President George H. W. Bush
sought China’s commitment to arms proliferation prevention, with
Beijing promising to abide by the MTCR Guidelines and Annex in
return for the U.S. lifting a ban on the export of satellites to China, a
negotiation which then-Foreign Minister Qian considered as marking
“the beginning of the lifting of sanctions that had been imposed on
China by the United States and other Western countries for two years
or more [since 1989].” 65 Furthermore, the regime promotes
accountability because members are unable to undermine one another.
Where an MTCR participant adheres to their obligation to not export
a banned item, they will need to be communicated with before a
comparable item can be sold by another member, with authorizing
conditions set out in the Guidelines. 66 Such a mechanism has
significant benefits in promoting rules-based trading and as noted
above, is the ‘norm’ amongst the biggest arms suppliers in the world.

22 U.S.C § 2797b (2020); see also MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL
REGIME, CTR. ARMS CONT. & NON-PROLIFERATION (2017), https://armscontrol
center.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Missile-Technology-Control-RegimeMTCR-Factsheet.pdf
[http://web.archive.org/web/20200423225135/https://
armscontrolcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Missile-TechnologyControl-Regime-MTCR-Factsheet.pdf] (last updated Mar. 3, 2021).
65
QIAN, supra note 14, at 146–49.
66 Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers, MISSILE TECHNOLOGY
CONTROL REGIME, https://mtcr.info/guidelines-for-sensitive-missile-relevanttransfers/
[http://web.archive.org/web/20210323003750/https://mtcr.info/
guidelines-for-sensitive-missile-relevant-transfers/].
64
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Whereas the MTCR focuses on WMD proliferation and
associated delivery systems, the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) on
Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and
Technologies may better suit the nature of LAWS through a
nonstrategic weapons ‘prism.’ The WA encompasses the same
membership as the MTCR (excluding two MTCR members – Brazil
and Iceland), while Mexico and eight additional European countries
(Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia) are members of the WA solely. 67 Considering some
technologies – many of which are now available to civilians – can have
their origins traced to inventions for military purposes, applying a
framework on dual-use technologies can be deemed a viable approach
for managing such a transition over time; although it is essential to
qualify that it can also have inadvertent consequences which must be
factored into the calculation. Chertoff recommends applying the WA
as “a ready platform for the near-term creation of a new export control
on LAWS and critical LAWS components” to “reduce the risk of
transfer to malicious non-state actors,” but notes the WA had once
“accidentally criminali[z]ed many of the necessary tools for stopping
malware” until an amendment was later created to address this error. 68
In comparing the MTCR and WA as optional models for arms control
sitting outside of the CCW framework, a distinction is the obligation
of members to inform the WA secretariat once they finalize an export
which hitherto had been rejected by a different participant. This is in
stark contrast to the requirements under the MTCR which calls for
consultation between participants prior to the supply of listed
armaments. 69

About Us, WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT, https://www.wassenaar
.org/about-us/
[http://web.archive.org/web/20210203042123/https://www.
wassenaar.org/about-us/]; see also Taylor, supra note 57.
68
Philip Chertoff, Perils of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Proliferation:
Preventing Non-State Acquisition, 2 GENEVA CTR. SEC. POL’Y 1, 7 (2018),
https://dam.gcsp.ch/files/2y10RR5E5mmEpZE4rnkLPZwUleGsxaWXTH3aoibz
iMaV0JJrWCxFyxXGS [http://web.archive.org/web/20190915220303/https://
dam.gcsp.ch/files/2y10RR5E5mmEpZE4rnkLPZwUleGsxaWXTH3aoibziMaV0J
JrWCxFyxXGS].
69 The Wassenaar Arrangement at a Glance, ARMS CONT. ASS’N (Dec. 2017),
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/wassenaar [http://web.archive.org/web/
20210126193346/https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/wassenaar].
67
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Given the improbability of constraints on LAWS being
negotiated before the CCW’s Review Conference is held in December
2021, discussions on the regulation of autonomous systems could
advance into a new direction, perhaps incorporating the arms control
model of the MTCR or the WA. A key risk is that where robots are
dual-use and states are unwilling to place prohibitions on their civilian
industries. For example, a statement by Japan in 2020 warned of a
“chilling effect” that would “hinder[] technological development and
innovation in the civil sectors,” should restrictive rules be developed. 70
Furthermore, ensuring adequate capacity to detect and trace a person
in urgent need of being rescued, such as during or following a disaster,
is analogous to providing humanitarian assistance that lawfully cannot
be denied during wartime. The export lists of the above arms control
agreements are further mitigation instruments to lessen the
misappropriation of LAWS, provided absolute prohibition is not
adopted as a CCW additional protocol.
Certainly, granted the amount of consensus it usually takes to
complete arms control agreements, an additional option is for the
states adept in researching the highly complex technologies necessary
to develop LAWS, to execute a tailored approach that meets current
needs, and would seek to expand the membership and rules over time.
They could incorporate a sunset clause to incentivize the remainder of
the international community to come to the negotiation table,
conceivably through the United Nations. An imminent expiry can
galvanize action as leaders respond with a greater sense of urgency,
such as during President Biden’s first phone call with President Putin
in January 2021, where both leaders indicated their “willingness to
extend New START for five years, agreeing to have their teams work
urgently to complete the extension by February 5,” 71 the date the
70
Japan, Commentary on the operationalization of the Guiding Principles
affirmed by the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the
Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems at national level 4 in GGE ON LAWS
(Sept. 21, 2020), https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/
20200828-Japan.pdf
[http://web.archive.org/web/20200916100055/https://documents.unoda.org/wp
-content/uploads/2020/09/20200828-Japan.pdf].
71
Press Release, White House, Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Call with President Vladimir Putin of Russia (Jan. 26, 2021),
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Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty was set to expire. Containing any
experiences discovered from an initial agreement on LAWS, a
mechanism later developed would also be a useful way to ‘update’ the
agreement before its preparation for signature and represents
incremental steps toward an ongoing and marked challenge in
decreasing, as the title of this article denotes, unintentional war.
CONCLUSION
Developing advanced technology that gives an advantage in
the battlefield is an expensive element of military strategy, yet in many
ways, it can be more costly to not do so at all. In the case of LAWS,
these devices may increase the capabilities of armed forces by
countering a greater quantum of threats presented by opponents.
Nonetheless, for as long as autonomous systems will remain an
untested or low-maturity technology, they would harbor the risk of
unintentional attacks, possibly inciting greater volatility. Therefore, the
emergence of LAWS has clearly engendered an ongoing political
challenge. In the above contemplation, we have suggested an approach
for decreasing the dangers emanating from the potential misuse of
LAWS. The anticipated result of considerations is the lessening of the
probability of unintentional war.
We began with discussion of leadership and security scenario
reactions, focusing on the response of newly sworn-in leaders to a
potential military crisis. As indicated in the case study, U.S. presidents
have faced such incidents with reference to negotiating ‘provocations’
with Chinese leaders early into their first term since the inauguration
of President George W. Bush in 2001. While President Biden will
certainly not face a decision where it is unclear if an uninhabited device
had caused an incident, the exponential growth in AI suggests a
Commander-in-Chief may one day face a relatively ambiguous
confrontation, perhaps involving LAWS. A thought experiment
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/26/
readout-of-president-joseph-r-biden-jr-call-with-president-vladimir-putin-of-russia/
[http://web.archive.org/web/20210130070210/https://www.whitehouse.gov/brie
fing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/26/readout-of-president-joseph-r-bidenjr-call-with-president-vladimir-putin-of-russia/].
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modelled on a previous collision elaborated on some of the envisaged
changes to diplomacy that may result. One outcome is clear: If the use
of LAWS is based on the premise that robots could possess enhanced
skills compared to humans, political leaders may find it difficult to
provide a justification for machine failure, particularly if attempting to
explain the actions committed by such a device as unintentional.
The second section considered enhanced collaboration rules to
decrease the probability of unintentional war. Placing an emphasis on
non-binding efforts to identify some common interests among parties,
including adversaries, proposals were provided in the form of
promoting mutual understanding of algorithmic interpretations of the
regulations governing conduct in war, as well as protections for
humanitarian workers. Furthermore, other areas were contemplated,
such as the funding challenges (and potential collaboration
opportunities) associated with hydrospatial infrastructure projects that
would be required for the use of LAWS in underwater domains.
The final section considered arms control frameworks under
which a mechanism on LAWS could be developed. Campaigners are
calling for negotiation on LAWS to begin ahead of the CCW’s Review
Conference in December 2021. 72 While this timeframe may produce a
sense of urgency that provides for more substantive discussions during
the next GGE, if this target is not met, it may dent the credibility of
the CCW (in the eyes of some participating NGOs) as a forum for
responding to emerging technologies. The MTCR, which meets nonproliferation standards recognized by the UNSC and has outreach
activities that include even those large arms exporters who are not its
members, was proposed as a model designed to promote responsible
adherence by participants. The WA, which has broader membership,
may also be considered as an arms control mechanism due to its focus
on dual-use technologies, which certainly would apply to the fields of
AI and robotics.
In examining how these governance options and
considerations for regulating LAWS may help states to prepare for an
already uncertain future, the principal motivation outlined above has
72

CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, supra note 54, at 2.
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been for states to find a means to collaborate in order to decrease the
probability of an unintentional war. The postwar rules-based order of
global governance, bolstered by the concert architecture of five
designated powers presiding over the veto of the UNSC, gives
“authority and responsibility” for “action as it deems necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and security.” 73 While
imperfect, this relationship has in many instances generated incentives
to pursue increased measures and, as the title of this article denotes,
must now contribute to decreasing unintentional war through
incremental steps and the greater universalization of arms control
mechanisms.

73

U.N Charter art. 51, ¶ 1.
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